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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Case No. 930206-CA

Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.

Priority No. 2

DAVID C. STREETER,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to aggravated assault, a third degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (1990), in the Third Judicial District
Court, Salt Lake County, the Honorable John A. Rokich presiding. He appeals from the
judgment and conviction entered on the plea. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1994).
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Did alleged illegalities prior to defendant's invocation of his Miranda rights in

his first interview taint defendant's confession in a second interview?
Standard of review. "In reviewing a trial court's determination on the voluntariness
of a confession, [the appellate court will] apply a bifurcated standard of review. Under the
bifurcated standard, the ultimate determination of whether a confession is voluntary is a legal
question, and [the appellate court will] review the trial court's ruling for correctness. To the

extent the trial court has made subsidiary factual findings, however, those findings will not
be set aside unless they are clearly erroneous. State v. Mabe. 864 P.2d 890, 892 (Utah
1993) (citations omitted).
2.

In the second interview, was defendant's waiver of his Fifth Amendment rights

knowing and intelligent, and his confession voluntary?
Standard of review. See issue No. 1.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULES
This case does not turn on the language of any constitutional provisions, statutes, or
rules.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant and two co-defendants1 were charged by amended information with the
following crimes:

1

Count I

Attempted criminal homicide, murder in the second degree, a second
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (1990);

Count II

Aggravated assault, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 76-5-103 (1990);

Count HI

Attempted criminal homicide, murder in the second degree, a second
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (1990);

Count IV

Attempted criminal homicide, murder in the second degree, a second
degree felony, in violation of 76-5-203 (1990).

The co-defendants were Dustin Ward and Kevin Harry Neff (R. 11).
2

Gang enhancements pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 (Supp. 1992) were sought in
connection with counts III and IV; a firearms enhancement pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §
76-3-203 (1990) was sought in connection with count IV (R. 11-15, addendum A).
Defendant filed a motion to suppress his partial confession as violative of the Utah
Constitution and the United States Constitution as construed in Miranda v. Arizona. 384 U.S.
436 (1966) and Edwards v. Arizona. 451 U.S. 477 (1981) (R. 67-68, 71-72). The trial court
denied this motion after an evidentiary hearing (R. 111-116).
Pursuant to a plea bargain, defendant pled guilty to aggravated assault, reserving his
right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress under State v. Serv. 758 P.2d 935 (Utah
App. 1988) (R. 161-67, 170).2
On March 1, 1993 defendant was sentenced to the statutory prison term, no fines, and
restitution as determined by Adult Probation and Parole (R. 175). Defendant timely filed his
Notice of Appeal (R. 177).
The court of appeals remanded to the trial court for entry of a finding as to whether
the issue reserved for appeal was dispositive as then required by State v. Montova. 858 P.2d
1027 (Utah App. 1993). State v. Streeter. 864 P.2d 910 (Utah App. 1993). The Utah
Supreme Court granted certiorari in both Montova and Streeter to consider the conditional
guilty plea issue only. It ruled in Montova that the issue reserved on a conditional guilty

2

It is apparent from the plea affidavit and minute entry that the parties were referring to
the original three-count information (R. 8-10) rather than the amended four-count information
(R. 11-14) in structuring the plea. Neither the Statement of Defendant (R. 161-67) nor the minute
entry (R. 170) recognizes the existence of a fourth count. The apparent intent of the parties was
to dismiss all counts except the one to which defendant pled guilty.

3

plea need not be dispositive of the case. State v. Montova. 253 Utah Adv. Rep. 68, 70
(Utah 1994). Accordingly, the supreme court remanded Streeter "to the court of appeals to
consider the merits of Streeter's appeal in that court" (Remittitur dated 15 December 1994).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This case arises out of two vicious gang attacks in the early morning hours of 22
September 1990.
THE CHARGED CRIMES3
First gang attack. According to the probable cause statement,4 a car driven by the
Mortensen family was forced to the side of the road at approximately 6407 West 4100 South,
West Valley City. Ten or more young men, including defendant, ran to the car and began
kicking and beating on it and threatening to kill the four occupants. The driver, Craig
Mortensen, managed to drive the car away and stopped at a nearby convenience store. As
his wife Karen called 911, defendant and his co-defendant Neff approached the Mortensen's
car carrying rocks and again threatening to kill the occupants. At that point,
Craig Mortenson [sic] grabbed a hammer from a tool box, stepped outside the
car and stated, "I have the right to defend myself." Streeter and Neff attacked
Craig Mortenson, beating on his head with a rock and kicking his face and
head. While Karen Mortenson pulled one of the assailants away form Craig
Mortenson the other ran at her with a rock. He was prevented from striking
Karen Mortenson only by the intervention of one of the Mortenson's teen-age
daughters.

3

Because this case arisesfroma guilty plea rather than a verdict, the State relies on the probable
cause statement to inform the Court of the charges against defendant.
4

Karen Mortensen, a victim, is the source of the information on the first attack.

4

Craig Mortenson was rushed by Life Flight to the University Medical Center, where
emergency surgery for a compound depressed skull fracture saved his life (R. 14).
Second gang attack. According to the probable cause statement,5 Mark Long and
Roland Olsen were parked at a convenience store on 7204 West 3500 South, West Valley
City. An argument arose between Olsen and Long in one truck and Dustin Ward and a
group of juveniles in another truck. "Suddenly there were twelve or more young men in the
parking lot," including defendant. A fight developed, and Olsen saw Streeter and his codefendants "repeatedly jumping on and kicking Mark Long in the face and head." Long was
lying on the ground at the time and, after the attack, was unconscious.
Olsen followed defendant and his co-perpetrators and confronted them about Long's
condition.
David Streeter pulled a 22 semi-automatic pistol and threatened to blow
Olsen's head off. Olsen turned and retreated while others chanted "shoot him,
shoot him," [and] Dustin Ward was throwing rocks at Olsen. When Olsen
was approximately twenty feet away from the group he heard the gun fire. A
projectile landed near his feet. As he turned back around he was struck in the
face by a tire iron. Then Kevin Neff struck him with a metal pipe.
Long's life was saved by emergency surgery on his fractured skull (R. 14-15).
DEFENDANT'S TWO INTERVIEWS
First interview. Detective Tracy Cowley interviewed defendant on 22 September
1990 at approximately 8:30 or 9:00 a.m. (R. 189-90). The interview was conducted at the
station house and was tape-recorded (R. 190). The tape-recording was transcribed and
appears as pages 1 and 2 of defendant's exhibit 1 (addendum B) (R. 191-92).

5

Roland Olsen, a victim, is the source of the information on the second attack.
5

Detective Cowley read defendant his Miranda rights, and defendant said he
understood them (R. 194). The following exchange then ensued:6
TC: Having these rights in mind do you wish to speak with us now without an
attorney present?
DS: No.
(Def. Ex. 1 at 1). Detective Cowley later testified that, in his mind, defendant's response
"required clarification" (R. 195). Accordingly, in "an effort to further understand his
previous statement" (R. 209), Detective Cowley continued the interview:
TC: You don't want to talk to us?
DS: I don't know why I am really even in here. All I was doing was sleeping over at
my friends lawn last night and the cops just come ripping in the yard and
arrested us and
TC: Well we have a bunch of questions we would like to ask you, would you be
willing to answer those questions without a lawyer present.
DS: Maybe some of them. It just depends cause I really don't know why I am here.
TC: So does that mean we can ask you questions and you will answer the ones you
want to answer?
DS: Yes I have the right to stop at any time through.
TC: Well, I'll tell you right now that if you take that attitude with us.
DS: Well I ain't trying to
TC: Because we have all the witnesses we need and we know who has done what and
who has done what to who. So I want the truth out of you and I want it now.
Now do you understand that?
DS: Yes

6

"TC" indicates Detective Tracy Cowley; "DS" indicates defendant David Streeter.
6

TC: Who were you with tonight[?]
DS: J.D.
TC: Who else?
DS: Some of my friends, I want my lawyer here, all you have to do is call my mom
and he will be down here.
TC: You want your attorney?
DS: Yes
TC: And you don't want to talk to us?
DS: Yes
TC: O.K.
(Def. Ex. 1 at 1-2). Whereupon the interview concluded (R. 211). Detective Cowley did
not attempt to locate an attorney for defendant (R. 202). Defendant was returned to the
holding cell (R. 212).
Defendant's request. An hour to two hours later, Officer Robert Dey "was checking
on cells again to see if people were, you know, physically all right, if they needed anything"
(R. 205, 230). He asked defendant only "if he needed anything"; defendant stated "that he
wanted to talk to the detective again" (R. 205, 213, 230).
Second interview. The second interview was recorded and transcribed and appears
on pages 3 through 10 of defendant's exhibit 1 (addendum B). Officer Bruce Sterner was
also present and asked a single question (R. 206-07).
Detective Cowley began by confirming that defendant recalled being Mirandized and
desired to waive his rights:

7

TC: Do you recall earlier that I had advised you of your rights?
DS: Yes.
TC: And after being advised of your rights you said that you wanted to talk to a
lawyer?
DS: Yes
TC: Now is it your desire [—] and you come forth voluntarily [--] that you want to
talk to me now?
DS: Yes
TC: And you want to talk to me without a lawyer?
DS: Yes
TC: Go ahead.
(Def. Ex. 1 at 3, addendum B). Thereafter defendant gave a partial and self-serving, but
nonetheless incriminating, description of his participation in the crimes. He said he threw a
rock that hit Craig Mortensen and admitted kicking him in the chest; he also admitted
kicking Mark Long in the head (see Def. Ex. 1 at 5-7, addendum B).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.

Defendant's dilemma in this case arises out of the fact of the two interviews. All

the alleged police misconduct occurred in the first interview, but all the incriminating
statements were made in the second interview, one to two hours later.

He therefore must

rely on "attenuation analysis" to demonstrate that alleged illegalities in the first interview
"tainted" his confession in the second. Defendant's claim fails because only actual
compulsion will taint a subsequent confession, and defendant cannot demonstrate actual
compulsion.
8

2.

Defendant's waiver of rights was knowing and intelligent, and his confession

voluntary. After defendant terminated the first interview by invoking his rights, he initiated
further conversation about the crime with police. Re-recitation of the Miranda warnings was
unnecessary because defendant remembered the previous warnings and had demonstrated his
understanding by actually exercising his Miranda rights. Police used no illegal or
questionable tactics.
ARGUMENT7
INTRODUCTORY CLARIFICATIONS
A number of factual assertions in the Brief of Appellant are incorrect, misleading, or
otherwise require clarification.
First, footnote 4 on page 6 of Brief of Appellant contains numerous factual assertions
regarding defendant's age, IQ, and education. The source of these assertions is a
psychological evaluation attached to a diagnostic evaluation report apparently prepared for
sentencing purposes.
Although Utah has no rule, most appellate courts, in reviewing the denial of a pretrial
motion to suppress evidence, will consider only evidence before the court at the suppression
hearing. See, e.g., United States v. Hicks. 978 F.2d 722, 724-25 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Baez v.
State. 425 S.E.2d 885, 890 (Ga. App. 1992); State v. Rvder. 315 N.W.2d 786, 788-89
aowa 1982); Aiken v. State. 647 A.2d 1229, 1232 (Md. App. 1994), cert, denied, 651 A.2d

7

Since ff[n]o attempt has been made to brief state constitutional questions," the State will
brief and this Court should consider "only the federal constitutional questions and decline to consider
whether any state rights are implicated." State v. Fulton. 742 P.2d 1208,1211 n.2 (Utah 1987),
cert, denied, 484 U.S. 1044 (1988).

9

854 (Md. 1995); Commonwealth v. Powers. 398 A.2d 1013, 1014 (Pa. 1979); 4 Wayne R.
LaFave, Search and Seizure § 11.1(c) (1987).
Some appellate courts will consider both pretrial and trial evidence in reviewing a
pretrial ruling. However, courts endorsing this rule generally do so in the context of
affirming the trial court's pretrial ruling. United States v. Muniz. 1 F.3d 1018, 1021-22
(10th Cir.), cert, denied, 114 S. Ct. 575 (1993); United States v. Martin, 982 F.2d 1236,
1239-40 n.2 (8th Cir. 1993); United States v. Basev. 816 F.2d 980, 983 n.l (5th Cir. 1987);
State v. Young, 576 So.2d 1048, 1054 n.l, 1055 (La. App. 1991); State v. Duncan. 879
S.W.2d 749, 751 (Mo. App. 1994). Contra State v. Kong. 883 P.2d 686, 688 (Hawaii App.
1994) (reversal).
This Court should not consider information unavailable to the district court at the
suppression hearing for the purpose of reversing the court's ruling on the motion to suppress.
Second, repeated references to defendant's having "broken down," Br. of Appellant
at 8, 18 n.13, 29, 33, are without support in the record or legal parlance. The record
indicates merely that defendant spent an hour to two hours in a cell, during which time an
officer "may have asked if he needed to go to the rest room or needed a drink of water,
anything like that" (R. 231). When an officer "asked him if he needed anything," defendant
said "that he wanted to talk to the detective again" (R. 230-31).
Utah courts have consistently used the term "broke down" or "break down" to mean
more than making a simple request after being left alone for one to two hours. For example,
Mares v. Hill. 118 Utah 484, 493-94, 222 P.2d 811, 815 (Utah 1950), cert, denied, 341
U.S. 933 (1951), refers to cases where "the prisoner broke down and confessed only after
10

days of long relays [sic] of questioning, wherein he was subjected to physical discomforts
and disregard for the rudimentary need of life with fear and intimidations exerted, all of
which were calculated to break his resistance." See also State v. Young, 780 P.2d 1233,
1237 (Utah 1989) (referring to "emotional courtroom outbursts, including instances where the
defendant wept and a recess was called because it was not clear whether the defendant 'was
going to break down'"); State v. Hegelman. 717 P.2d 1348, 1349 (Utah 1986) (after an
officer "grabbed defendant... by the lapels, moved him sideways against a nearby filing
cabinet, and called him a rapist," defendant "broke down and cried for a minute, composed
himself, and then confessed to the crimes"); State v. Johns. 615 P.2d 1260, 1262 (Utah
1980) (victim "appeared emotionally distraught when she first entered the store and broke
down completely and began to cry when the police arrived"); State v. Pendergrass. 803 P.2d
1261, 1263 (Utah App. 1990) ("defendant broke down crying"). This case involves none of
the fear, intimidation, emotional outbursts, fisticuffs, or tears generally associated in this
state with the term "broke down."
Third, defendant's repeated assertion that he was held "incommunicado," Br. of
Appellant at 24 n.15, 29, 33, 34, is misleading. Defendant was kept in a holding cell with a
"large . . . group of people" (R. 230-31). The period during which defendant claims to have
been held "incommunicado" was at most two hours, hardly time to process and book the
large number of people who were sharing his holding cell.
Fourth, the description of defendant as being "of a tender age," Br. of Appellant at
26, is misleading. Even assuming that defendant was 18 years old on the date of the attack,
18 is not "a tender age" as that term is used in Utah. See, e.g., State v. Butterfield. 784
11

P.2d 153, 154 (Utah 1989) (14 years); State v. Wilkerson. 612 P.2d 362, 365 (Utah 1980) (6
years); Thomas v. Union Pacific Railroad. 548 P.2d 621, 623 (Utah 1976) (22 months);
State ex reL Mullen. 29 Utah 2d 376, 377, 510 P.2d 531, 531 (Utah 1973) ("small
children"); Baldwin v. Nielsen. 110 Utah 172, 178, 170 P.2d 179, 182 (Utah 1946) (Wolfe,
J., dissenting) (4 years).
Fifth, defendant claims that the police had "concerns that David Streeter would not
submit to interrogation after consultation with an attorney." Br. of Appellant at 29.
Defendant cites no record support for this factual assertion and the record contains none.
The record does reflect that there was a "large . . . group of people" in the holding cell at
the time (R. 230-31). The most reasonable inference from this fact is that the officers simply
chose to continue processing and interviewing these people rather than to drop their business
and do defendant a favor by calling his mother.
Sixth, defendant claims to define "the extent to which David Streeter understood his
rights," and asserts that "David Streeter's knowledge of his rights was limited to his prior
receipt of Miranda warnings . . . " Br. of Appellant at 30, 32. In fact, the record reflects
nothing about the extent of defendant's knowledge of his rights. Perhaps, like 20-year-old
Lance Conway Wood, defendant had "heard them a thousand times." State v. Wood. 868
P.2d 70, 86 (Utah 1993).

12

POINT I
DEFENDANT'S CLAIM FAILS BECAUSE ONLY ACTUAL COMPULSION
WILL TAINT A SUBSEQUENT CONFESSION, AND DEFENDANT CANNOT
DEMONSTRATE ACTUAL COMPULSION
Defendant's dilemma in this case arises out of the fact of the two interviews. All the
alleged police misconduct occurred in the first interview, but all the incriminating statements
were made in the second interview, one to two hours later.

Defendant's dilemma is

heightened by two additional facts: (1) he peremptorily ended the first interview by invoking
his Miranda rights, and (2) the police began the second interview by reminding defendant of
his Miranda rights and that he had successfully invoked them in the first interview.
In order to succeed in his claim, defendant must link the two interviews in such a way
that the alleged illegalities in the first fatally taint the second.
The United States Supreme Court has rejected the "taint" analysis where the prior
illegality is merely a Miranda violation. In Oregon v. Elstad. 470 U.S. 298 (1985), an 18year-old suspect was taken into custody and, in response to police questioning and without a
Miranda warning, voluntarily admitted his involvement in a burglary. One hour later and
after a proper Miranda warning, the suspect confessed. The Oregon Court of Appeals
required suppression of the confession on the ground that it was tainted by the coercive
impact of the unconstitutionally obtained statement, since "'the cat was sufficiently out of the
bag to exert a coercive impact on [Elstad's] later admissions.'" Id. at 303 (quoting State v.
Elstad. 658 P.2d 552, 554 (Ore. App. 1983).
The Supreme Court reversed. The Court stressed that although the Miranda
exclusionary rule "serves the Fifth Amendment," it "sweeps more broadly than the Fifth
13

Amendment itself" and therefore "may be triggered even in the absence of a Fifth
Amendment violation." Elstad. 470 U.S. at 306. "The Fifth Amendment prohibits use by
the prosecution in its case in chief only of compelled testimony." Id. at 306-07.
The Court held that, so long as an unwarned interrogation "involved no actual
compulsion," a subsequent, warned confession was not "fruit of the poisonous tree." Id. at
305, 308. There is thus no need to demonstrate that intervening events break the causal
connection between the illegal interrogation and the confession "so that the confession is
'sufficiently an act of free will to purge the primary taint.'" Id. at 306 (quoting Taylor v.
Alabama. 457 U.S. 687, 690 (1982) (in turn quoting Brown v. Illinois. 422 U.S. 590, 602
(1975))). All that is required is administration of a Miranda warning, which "serves to cure
the condition that rendered the unwarned statement inadmissible." Elstad. 470 U.S. at 311.
Moreover, "the fact that the police interview was coercive [is] not enough, by itself,
to render the defendant's confession involuntary. To be involuntary there must be a causal
relationship between the coercion and the subsequent confession." State v. Mabe. 864 P.2d
890, 893 (Utah 1993).
Thus, in order to prevail, defendant must demonstrate both the existence of "actual
compulsion" in the first interview and a causal link to defendant's confession in the second.
This he cannot do.
A. Police ceased interrogation when defendant unequivocally invoked his
Miranda rights.
Defendant claims that the police continued to interrogate him after he invoked his
constitutional right to remain silent and not to be interrogated without an attorney present.
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Br. of Appellant at 11-17. This is not a claim of actual compulsion, but of violation of the
prophylactic rules of Miranda and its progeny. Therefore, this argument does not advance
defendant toward his goal of proving that the second interview was tainted. It is therefore
irrelevant to this case. However, no Miranda violation occurred in any event.
Only an unequivocal and unambiguous request for counsel requires police to cease
interrogation. The United States Supreme Court has recently held that, in order to invoke
the right to counsel, a suspect "must articulate his desire to have counsel present sufficiently
clearly that a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand the statement
to be a request for an attorney. If the statement fails to meet the requisite level of clarity,
Edwards does not require that the officers stop questioning the suspect." Davis v. United
States, 114 S. Ct. 2350, 2355 (1994) (holding that phrase "Maybe I should talk to a lawyer"
was not a request for counsel). The Court expressing declined to adopt a rule "requiring
officers to ask clarifying questions" when a suspect makes an ambiguous or equivocal
invocation of counsel. Id. at 2356. "If the suspects' statement is not an unambiguous or
unequivocal request for counsel, the officers have no obligation to stop questioning him."
Id.
It is settled law that "an accused . . ., having expressed his desire to deal with the
police only through counsel, is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until
counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further
communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police." Edwards v. Arizona. 451
U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981) (emphasis added). However, "this prohibition on further
questioning-like other aspects of Miranda~is not itself required by the Fifth Amendment's
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prohibition on coerced confessions, but is instead justified only by reference to its
prophylactic purpose." Davis. 114 S. Ct. at 2355 (quoting Connecticut v. Barrett. 479 U.S.
523, 528 (1987)).
In the case at bar, the district court found that "[t]he police officer conducting the
first interrogation ceased interrogation when the defendant requested counsel" (R. 114,
addendum C). Such "subsidiary factual findings" "will not be set aside unless they are
clearly erroneous." Mabe. 864 P.2d at 892; accord State v. Wood. 868 P.2d 70, 83 (Utah
1993). Defendant has failed to demonstrate that this finding is clearly erroneous.
Initial invocation equivocal. Defendant's first invocation of his rights-or, more
precisely, his refusal to waive them-appears to be equivocal. Detective Cowley asked,
"Having these rights in mind do you wish to speak with us now without an attorney
present?" Defendant answered, "No" (Def. Ex. 1 at 1, addendum B).8 Detective Cowley
considered this response to be equivocal. He testified as follows at the suppression hearing:
Q. [By defense counsel] That answer was unequivocal, wasn't it?
A. That's right.
Q. It required no clarification, did it?
A. Well, in my mind it did.
(R. 195, emphasis added).

8

Although defendant describes his "no" as "emphatic," Br. of Appellant at 12, the record
does not support this characterization. It does not reflect defendant's "appearance and demeanor,
his manner of expression and tone of voice, . . . or his tendency to hesitate . . . " Child v. Child.
8 Utah 2d 261, 267, 332 P.2d 981, 985 (Utah 1958).
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Defendant apparently assumes that the clarity of a response must be judged entirely
by the response itself. Br. of Appellant at 13 ("No means no."). However, sometimes the
ambiguity of a response may be traced to the question. Thus, "questions with negatives and
double negative clauses" State v. McMillan. 588 P.2d 162, 164 (Utah 1978), may cause
confusion even where their answers are categorical. In this case, Detective Cowley's
question included the word without. While technically not negative, without is "virtually
negative" and so may occasion "negative confusion." H. W. Fowler, A Dictionary of
Modern English Usage 716 (Sir Ernest Gowers, ed., Oxford University Press 1965).
Detective Cowley's assertion that "I wanted to clarify and that's why I asked him the
next question" (id.) is borne out in the transcript. He followed with a series of questions in
an obvious attempt to evoke an unequivocal response from an evasive suspect:
TC: You don't want to talk to us?
DS: I don't know why I am really even in here. All I was doing was sleeping over at
my friends lawn last night and the cops just come ripping in the yard and
arrested us and
TC: Well we have a bunch of questions we would like to ask you, would vou be
willing to answer those questions without a lawyer presentf?!
DS: Maybe some of them. It just depends cause I really don't know why I am here.
TC: So does that mean we can ask vou questions and vou will answer the ones vou
want to answer?
DS: Yes I have the right to stop at any time though.
(Def. Ex. 1 at 1-2).9 After this waiver, Officer Cowley began the interrogation. Defendant

9

That Detective Cowley is sensitive to the potential ambiguity in ayes or no answer is apparent
(continued...)
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said nothing incriminating. He then asserted his rights unequivocally and the interview
promptly concluded (see Def. Ex. 1 at 2; R. 211).
Initial invocation unequivocal. Even if defendant's initial refusal to waive his rights
had been unequivocal, his rights were still respected because Detective Cowley immediately
ceased interrogation.
Strictly speaking, Miranda does not require that all communication or even
questioning cease upon the suspect's assertion of his rights, only that interrogation cease.
Rhode Island v. Innis. 446 U.S. 291 (1980) (holding that officer's comment that it would be
too bad if a little girl killed herself with the murderer's discarded shotgun was not
interrogation under Miranda): Miranda. 384 U.S. at 473-74 ("If the individual indicates in
any manner . . . that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease."); id. at 479
("unless and until such warnings and waiver are demonstrated . . ., no evidence obtained as
a result of interrogation can be used against him").
Interrogation "refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions
on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the
police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the
suspect." Innis. 446 U.S. at 301.
United States v. DougalL 919 F.2d 932 (5th Cir. 1990), cert, denied, 501 U.S. 1234
(1991), illustrates this distinction. After being Mirandized, Dougall requested an attorney.

9

(... continued)
from his own examination in the suppression hearing (see R. 196-97). He prefers the clearer
"That's correct" or "that's right," especially to a question containing a negative element.
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Thereafter, officers "requested minimal personal data from Dougall-name, social security
number, birth date, birth place, height, weight, and address." Id. at 934. They also
requested "a hair sample, informing Dougall that they would obtain a court order if he failed
to comply voluntarily." Id. Dougall began to talk about the charges, then again requested
an attorney. The officers sat silently with him in the room for a short time, and Dougall
confessed.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ruled for the government. Citing Innis.
the court stated that w[n]one of the actions of which Dougall now complains amounts to
improper interrogation." Id. at 936. Hence, admission of the hair samples and confession
were held proper. See also United States v. Moreno-Flores. 33 F.3d 1164, 1169-70 (9th
Cir. 1994) (after suspect invoked his right to silence, agents told him that they had seized
600 pounds of cocaine and that he was in trouble and asked suspect where he was the night
after the drug bust; held, no Miranda violation).
Like the innocuous questions in Dougall. Detective Cowley's question, "You don't
want to talk to us?" was not reasonably likely to, and did not, elicit an incriminating
response. It was therefore not interrogation for Miranda purposes.
Admittedly, Detective Cowley's later statement, "So I want the truth and I want it
now" (Def. Ex. 1 at 2, addendum B) was reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating
response. It therefore constituted interrogation. However, it followed defendant's waiver:
TC: So does that mean we can ask you questions and you will answer the ones you
want to answer?
DS: Yes I have the right to stop at any time though.
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(Def. Ex. 1 at 1-2). Hence, Detective Cowley's interrogation was not illegal. And of
course, defendant abruptly invoked his rights only seconds later, Detective Cowley just as
abruptly and without discussion concluded the interview.
B.

The police had no duty to provide counsel to defendant.

Defendant complains that police did not call his mother to obtain him an attorney.
Br. of Appellant at 17. Again, defendant does not contend that by not calling his mother to
obtain an attorney constituted actual compulsion. Consequently, this omission, even if a
violation of Miranda, cannot taint defendant's later confession. See Oregon v. Elstad. supra.
It is therefore irrelevant to this case. However, even viewed in isolation, defendant's
argument fails because defendant cannot establish that the police had any legal duty to assist
defendant in obtaining counsel.
Defendant had no Sixth Amendment right to counsel at his arrest. "The Sixth
Amendment right to counsel attaches only at the initiation of adversary criminal proceedings,
see United States v. Gouveia. 467 U.S. 180, 188 (1984), and before proceedings are initiated
a suspect in a criminal investigation has no constitutional right to the assistance of counsel."
Davis. 114 S. Ct. at 2354. Accord State v. Wood. 868 P.2d 70, 86 (Utah 1993). Since
adversary judicial criminal proceedings had not been initiated at the time of defendant's
interviews, his Sixth Amendment right to counsel had not yet attached. Thus, to the extent
defendant may claim that the Cowley interview violated his Sixth Amendment right to
counsel, see Br. of Appellant at 18, his claim is without merit.
Defendant implies that the Fifth Amendment requires police to provide counsel or
access to a telephone so that he could obtain counsel. Yet he cites no controlling authority
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supporting this suggestion. The only Utah, United States, or even Tenth Circuit case he cites
is State v. Moore. 697 P.2d 233, 236 (Utah 1985), which is not a Sixth Amendment right-tocounsel case.
The foreign precedents he cites are weak. For example, People v. Locke. 200 Cal.
Rptr. 20 (Cal. App. 1984), states that a warned suspect must be given an opportunity to
telephone an attorney. However, this conclusion rests on a California statute providing that
"an arrested person has the right to make at least three completed telephone calls . . ."Cal.
Penal Code § 851.5, cited in Locke. 200 Cal. Rptr. at 22. 10
United States v. Guido. 704 F.2d 675 (2d Cir. 1983), also relied upon by defendant,
merely opines that "the better procedure would have been to permit Guido to call his attorney
on Guido's arrival at the . . . courthouse . . . " Id. at 678. Guido involved a suspect who,
after his Miranda warning, requested an opportunity to call his attorney. After being told by
police that "he should consider cooperating with the authorities in their investigation, and that
he should discuss the possibility of cooperation with his attorney" Guido asked about details
of the crime, which the police explained. He then confessed. The Second Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed the trial court's finding that Guido's rights had not been violated. This
case supports the State's position.
In Commonwealth v. Zook. 553 A.2d 920 (Pa.), cert, denied, 493 U.S. 873 (1989),
also cited by defendant, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania split 4-3 on the question of
whether the suspect's asking "if he could use the phone to call his mother to see if she could

10

This was one of two "cites omitted" from defendant's brief. Cf. Br. of Appellant at 19.
The other is a case applying the statute. See In re Newbern. 360 P.2d 43, 46 (Cal. App. 1961).
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get him an attorney" was an equivocal or unequivocal invocation of his right not to be
interrogated without counsel present. Four justices believed that Zook "clearly invoked his
rights under Miranda"; three justices believed the statement was "equivocal." Id. at 922-23;
923 (Larsen, J., dissenting). Whether police were required to provide a telephone was not at
issue in the case.
That Detective Cowley did not fetch defendant a phone is irrelevant. He had no duty
to do so.
C. The police did not threaten defendant.
Defendant claims that he was threatened by Detective Cowley in the first interview.
This claim is relevant, because a threat is a tactic, like actual coercion, "calculated to
undermine the suspect's ability to exercise his free will." Elstad. 470 U.S. at 309. Here is
the passage upon which defendant bases his claim to have been threatened:
TC: So does that mean we can ask you questions and you will answer the ones
you want to answer?
DS: Yes I have the right to stop at any time though.
TC: Well. I'll tell vou right now that if vou take that attitude with us.
DS: Well I ain't trying to
TC: Because we have all the witnesses we need and we know who has done
what and who has done what to who. So I want the truth out of vou and
I want it now. Now do vou understand that?
DS: Yes
TC: Who were you with tonightf?]
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(Def. Ex. 1 at 2, addendum B, emphasis added). Although defendant now complains that
Detective Cowley's comments threatened "some unspecified dire consequences," Br. of
Appellant at 21, defendant in fact easily and without consequences shrugged off these
purported threats and invoked his rights almost immediately:
TC: Who were you with tonight[?]
DS: J.D.
TC: Who else?
DS: Some of my friends, I want mv lawyer here, all vou have to do is call my
mom and he will be down here.
TC: You want your attorney?
DS: Yes
TC: And vou don't want to talk to us?
DS: Yes
TC: O.K.
(Def. Ex. 1 at 2).
Detective Cowley admonished defendant to tell the truth and implied that the police
already had the whole truth. Even "telling the accused that it would be better for him to
speak or tell the truth does not furnish any inducement, or a sufficient inducement, to render
objectionable a confession thereby obtained, unless threats or promises are applied." State v.
Griffin. 754 P.2d 965, 970 (Utah App. 1988) (quoting State v. Ashdown. 5 Utah 2d 59, 296
P.2d 726 (1956)).
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Also, the mere fact that police may make threatening remarks does not establish that a
confession is involuntary. Although the Supreme Court in the nineteenth century held that
"any threat or promise, however slight, renders a confession involuntary and inadmissible,
later cases do not repeat that rigid rule but follow the totality of all the circumstances test."
State v. Strain. 779 P.2d 221, 227 (Utah 1989).
State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439 (Utah 1988), is illustrative. There, an interrogating
officer said in defendant's presence, T m going to punch his lights out." Id. at 462. He
also implied that Bishop was going to prison, where the other prisoners "would not react
well" when they learned he liked to "sleep with little boys." Id. The Utah Supreme Court
held that "[although some of [the officer's] remarks during the initial interview may be
characterized as 'threatening' in nature, when viewed in the totality of surrounding
circumstances, the police interrogation does not reveal utilization of those impermissible
methods proscribed by the fourteenth amendment." Id.
The salient fact in the case at bar is that defendant did not confess after the alleged
threats, but peremptorily terminated the interview. Only later, after being reminded of his
rights and that he had previously exercised them, did he confess.
D. Police conduct did not "taint" defendant's confession.
Defendant has failed to establish any actual coercion in violation of the Fifth
Amendment, as opposed to the prophylactic Miranda rules. Moreover, he has failed to
acknowledge his burden to establish a causal link between the alleged coercion and
defendant's subsequent confession. Therefore, the attenuation analysis does not apply here.
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However, even under attenuation analysis, defendant's claim fails. The relevant
factors are (1) whether Miranda warnings were given, (2) the temporal proximity of the
illegality and the confession, (3) the absence or presence of intervening circumstances, and
(4) the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct. Allen. 839 P.2d at 300-01.
The factors here favor attenuation. (1) Defendant received Miranda warnings at the
beginning of the first interview and was reminded of them at the beginning of the second.
He also invoked his Miranda rights at least once, to end the first interview. (2) There was a
one- to two-hour hiatus between interviews. (3) One intervening circumstance is decisive:
after the alleged police illegality, defendant invoked his rights and Detective Cowley ceased
all interrogation and conversation immediately. (4) The purposes of the alleged police
illegality were to clarify defendant's response and to encourage him to tell the truth. The
police conduct cannot by any stretch of the imagination be termed flagrant.
In sum, because defendant cannot establish actual coercion, this case does not qualify
for attenuation analysis. But even if it did, that analysis requires admitting the confession.
POINT H
IN THE SECOND INTERVIEW, DEFENDANT'S WAIVER OF RIGHTS WAS
KNOWING AND INTELLIGENT, AND HIS CONFESSION VOLUNTARY
A. Full re-recitation of the Miranda warnings was unnecessary.
Defendant claims that his confession in the second interview was unwarned because
Detective Cowley did not repeat in full the Miranda warnings he had administered one to two
hours earlier in the first interview. Here is what was said in that second interview:
TC: Do you recall earlier that I had advised you of your rights?
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DS: Yes.
TC: And after being advised of your rights you said that you wanted to talk to
a lawyer?
DS: Yes
TC: Now is it your desire and you come forth voluntarily that you want to talk
to me now?
DS: Yes
TC: And you want to talk to me without a lawyer?
DS: Yes
TC: Go ahead.
(Def. Ex. 1 at 3, addendum B).
Defendant did not need to be re-Mirandized, because his initial Miranda warning
remained effective. Miranda warnings are not accorded "unlimited efficacy or perpetuity."
United States v. Hopkins. 433 F.2d 1041, 1045 (5th Cir. 1970), cert, denied, 401 U.S.
1013, 91 S. Ct. 1252 (1971). Nevertheless, a warning once given may have continuing
effect past the interview in which it was given, so that statements made in later interrogations
will be considered warned. See, e.g., Martin v. Wainwrieht. 770 F.2d 918, 930 (11th Cir.
1985) (seven days), cert, denied, 479 U.S. 909 (1986); Maeuire v. United States. 396 F.2d
327, 331 (9th Cir. 1968) (three days), cert, denied, 393 U.S. 1099 (1969); Whitmore v.
Lockhart. 834 F. Supp. 1105, 1124 (E.D. Ark. 1992) (two days), aff'd, 8 F.3d 614 (8th Cir.
1993) (no discussion of Miranda issue): United States v. Smith. 679 F. Supp. 410, 411 (D.
Del. 1988) (two and a half hours); State v. Henrv. 863 P.2d 861, 869 (Ariz. 1993) (six
hours); People v. Mickle. 814 P.2d 290, 305 (Cal. 1991) (en banc) (thirty-six hours), cert.
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denied, 112 S.Ct. 1679 (1992); State v. Kimble. 546 So. 2d 834, 840 (La. App. 1989) (two
days); State v. Butzin. 404 N.W.2d 819, 826 (Minn. App. 1987) (nineteen hours); State v.
Fisher. 350 S.E.2d 334, 341 (N.C. 1986) ("very brief"); Babcock v. State. 473 S.W.2d 941,
943 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971) (two days).
The need for a second warning is governed by the totality of circumstances test.
Commonwealth v. Ferguson. 282 A.2d 378, 379 (Pa. 1971). Relevant factors include "the
amount of time that has passed since the waiver, any change in the identity of the
interrogator or the location of the interview, any official reminder of the prior advisement,
the suspect's sophistication or past experience with law enforcement, and any indicia that he
subjectively understands and waives his rights. People v. Mickle. 814 P.2d 290, 305 (Cal.
1991) (en banc), cert, denied, 112 S. Ct. 1679 (1992).
Where the record is clear that defendant "subjectively understands and waives his
rights," that fact should conclude the inquiry. Indeed, this appears to be the rule in Utah.
State v. Hilfiker. 868 P.2d 826, 831 (Utah App. 1994) (subsequent confession was knowing
and intelligent where police told defendant he was "still under Miranda"). Here, Detective
Cowley scrupulously obtained defendant's waivers. He specifically reminded defendant that
he had been advised of his rights and that he had in fact invoked his rights to remain silent
and not to be interrogated without counsel present. Detective Cowley was also careful to
ensure that defendant both wanted to talk and wanted to talk without a lawyer. He also
confirmed that these waivers were defendant's "desire" and that he was coming forth
"voluntarily" to talk (Def. Ex. 1 at 3, addendum B). That should conclude the inquiry.
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Defendant's belief that "[r]e-Mirandizing should be required prior to all subsequent
interrogations," Br. of Appellant at 30, is inconsequential: this ground was not preserved
below; his proposed rule is followed, apparently, only in Hawaii; the rule is not required by
the Court that created Miranda; and, as demonstrated by the facts of this case, the rule is
poor policy.
B. Defendant demonstrated his understanding of his Miranda rights by
terminating the first interview by invoking them.
If anything in this case is clear, it is this: defendant understood his Miranda rights.
They were explained to him in the first interview. He later brusquely ended the interview by
invoking these rights. Once defendant made clear that he did not want to talk, the police
stopped the interrogation without discussion. In the second interview, defendant was
reminded of his rights and, further, reminded that he had curtailed the first interview by
invoking them. Then he was asked separately about his desire to waive his right to remain
silent and his right to have counsel present. He waived both categorically.
Defendant's claim on appeal that his "will was overborne" contradicts the facts.
C. Defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to
counsel.
Defendant claims that he did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive his
right to counsel. Br. of Appellant at 33.
"Statements made by a person after invoking the right to counsel are admissible if (1)
the accused, not the law enforcement officers, initiates the conversations in which the
incriminating statements are made; (2) the prosecution shows a knowing and intelligent
waiver of accused's right to counsel; and (3) the prosecution shows by a preponderance of
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evidence that the statements were voluntarily made." State v. Hilfiker. 868 P.2d 826, 830
(Utah App. 1994) (citing State v. Moore, 697 P.2d 233, 236 (Utah 1985)). All three factors
are met here.
Initiation, it is undisputed that defendant initiated the conversation in which the
incriminating statements were made.
Knowing and intelligent waiver. The trial court found that M[t]he defendant made a
knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel." It went on to find that "it is evident
that defendant understood that he had a right to counsel and that he elected to proceed
without benefit of counsel. . . . There was no evidence presented that would indicate that
defendant did not make an intelligent and voluntary decision to proceed with the
interrogation" (R. 115, addendum C). Defendant does not acknowledge this finding on
appeal. As demonstrated above, it is clearly correct.
Again, the case at bar resembles Hilfiker. Hilfiker terminated an initial interview by
invoking his right to counsel. He later initiated discussion about the crime. Speaking of this
second discussion, this Court wrote that Hilfiker "was informed of his Miranda rights . . .
[The officer] stated, 'I want to make it clear here . . . that you're still under Miranda, you
have requested an attorney, . . . if you wish to make a statement, we'll listen to it. . . . I
want you to understand that you still have that right to an attorney." Hilfiker. 868 P.2d at
831. Hilfiker "acknowledged his rights and still proceeded to make the incriminating
statements." Id. The court found his waiver to be knowing and intelligent.
Statements voluntary. "[T]he inquiry into voluntariness is never mechanical, but
must duly consider both the characteristics of the accused and the details of the
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interrogation." Allen. 839 P.2d at 300. "In order for a confession to be admissible, it must
be made freely and voluntarily; it must not be extracted by threats or violence or obtained by
improper influence or promises." State v. Watts. 639 P.2d 158, 160 (Utah 1981). "The
ultimate inquiry is . . . whether physical or psychological force or other improper threats or
promises prompted the accused to talk when he otherwise would not have done so." Allen.
839 P.2d at 300. "The fact that a suspect chooses to speak after being informed of his rights
is, of course, highly probative." Elstad, 470 U.S. at 318.
The district court's finding that defendant waived his rights voluntarily is clearly
correct. The police employed no violence, no trickery, no psychological pressure, and no
"improper threats or promises." Defendant's confession was entirely legal and admissible.
CONCLUSION
Defendant's conviction should be affirmed.
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED: WRITTEN OPINION NOT REQUESTED
Because the State anticipates a reply brief in this case, oral argument is requested. If
no reply brief is filed, the State does not request oral argument. Since the resolution of this
case involves no novel legal question, a written opinion is unnecessary.
RESPECTFULLY submitted on [_/March 1995.
JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General
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IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
Screened by:
Assigned to:

THE STATE OF UTAH,

B. Byrne
B. Byrne

Plaintiff,
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AMENDED INFORMATION
A) DAVID STREETER
B) DUSTIN WARD
C) KEVIN HARRY NEFF

9/14/72,
7/6/72,
9/22/72,

Criminal No.

901-10868
10869
10870

Defendant(s).

The undersigned
£>Ae3l8£/ f. /R /JUJ£
under oath states
on information and belief that the defendant(s) committed the crimes
of:
COUNT I
ATTEMPTED CRIMINAL HOMICIDE, MURDER IN THE SECOND DEGREE, a Second
Degree Felony, at 6000 West 4100 South, in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, on or about September 22, 1990,
in violation of Title 76, Chapter 5, Section 203, Utah
Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendants,
DAVID STREETER and KEVIN HARRY NEFF, as parties to the
offense, intentionally or knowingly attempted to cause
the death of Craig Mortenson, and/or intending to cause
serious bodily injury to another, committed an act
clearly dangerous to human life, and thereby attempted
to cause the death of Craig Mortenson, and/or acting
under circumstances evidencing depraved indifference to
human life, engaged in conduct which created a grave
risk of death to another, and thereby attempted to cause
the death of Craig Mortenson;
(Continued on page 2)
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COUNT II
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, a Third Degree Felony, at 6000 West 4100 South,
in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or about
September 22, 1990, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 5,
Section 103, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in
that the defendants, DAVID STREETER and KEVIN HARRY
NEFF, as parties to the offense, assaulted Karen
Mortenson, by attempting to do bodily injury, and/or by
threatening to do bodily injury to Karen Mortenson with
unlawful force or violence, by the use of a dangerous
weapon, to-wit: Rock:
COUNT III
ATTEMPTED CRIMINAL HOMICIDE, MURDER IN THE SECOND DEGREE, a Second
Degree Felony, at 7204 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, on or about September 22, 1990,
in violation of Title 76, Chapter 5, Section 203, Utah
Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendants,
DAVID STREETER, DUSTIN WARD and KEVIN HARRY NEFF, as
parties to the offense, intentionally or knowingly
attempted to cause the death of Mark K. Long, and/or
intending to cause serious bodily injury to another,
committed an act clearly dangerous to human life, and
thereby attempted to cause the death of Mark K. Long,
and/or acting under circumstances evidencing depraved
indifference to human life, engaged in conduct which
created a grave risk of death to another, and thereby
attempted to cause the death of Mark K. Long;
SENTENCING ENHANCEMENT: further, that the offense was
committed in concert with two or more persons in the
commission or furtherance of the offenses, giving rise
to enhanced penalties as provided by Section 76-3-203.1,
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended;

(Continued on page 3)
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COUNT IV
ATTEMPTED CRIMINAL HOMICIDE, MURDER IN THE SECOND DEGREE, a Second
Degree Felony, at 7204 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, on or about September 22, 1990,
in violation of Title 76, Chapter 5, Section 203, Utah
Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendants,
DAVID STREETER, DUSTIN WARD and KEVIN HARRY NEFF, as
parties to the offense, intentionally or knowingly
attempted to cause the death of Ronald Olson, and/or
intending to cause serious bodily injury to another,
committed an act clearly dangerous to human life, and
thereby attempted to cause the death of Ronald Olson,
and/or acting under circumstances evidencing depraved
indifference to human life, engaged in conduct which
created a grave risk of death to another, and thereby
attempted to cause the death of Ronald Olson, and/or
while in the commission, attempted commission, or
immediate flight from the commission or attempted
commission of: Criminal Homicide, attempted to cause
the death of Ronald Olson;
SENTENCING ENHANCEMENT: That a firearm or a facsimile
of a firearm or the representation of a firearm was used
in the commission or furtherance of the Attempted
Homicide, giving rise to enhanced penalties as provided
by Section 76-3-203, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as
amended;
further, that the offense was committed in
concert with two or more persons in the commission or
furtherance of the offenses, giving rise to enhanced
penalties as provided by Section 76-3-203.1, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953, as amended;
THIS INFORMATION
WITNESSES:
Officers:

IS BASED ON EVIDENCE OBTAINED FROM THE FOLLOWING

B. Sterner, T. Cowley, A. Call, D. Jensen, R, Day, A.
Call, T. Cowley, K. Lindgren, S. Bell, R. Judd and R.
Edwards.

(Continued on page 4)
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Others:

Maryann Mortensen, Paul Knight, Craig Mortensen, Karrie
Mortensen# Dr. David Wilson, Karen Mortensen, Mark K. Long,
Roland Olsen, Susan C. Taylor, Charles E. Roberts, Cory
Losser, Kody Evans, Ronald Shepherd, Dr. David Wilson and
Dr.J. Charles Rich.

PROBABLE CAUSE STATEMENT:
Your affiants, Detectives with West Valley City Police
Department, and the Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office, bases this
Information on the following:
1. Conversation with Karen Mortenson in which she stated
that on September 22, 1990, at approximately 6407 West 4100 South,
their car was forced to the side of the road and ten or more young
men, including the three above named suspects, ran to the Mortenson
car, began kicking and beating on the car and threatening to kill the
four occupants. The driver of the victim's car, Craig Mortenson,
managed to drive the car away and stopped at a 7-Eleven on 6000 West
4100 South. As Karen Mortenson spoke to the 911 dispatcher Streeter
and Neff approached the Mortenson's car carrying rocks and
threatening again to kill the occupants. Craig Mortenson grabbed a
hammer from a tool box, stepped outside the car and stated, Ml have
the right to defend myself."
Streeter and Neff attacked Craig
Mortenson, beating on his head with a rock and kicking his face and
head. While Karen Mortenson pulled one of the assailants away from
Craig Mortenson the other ran at her with a rock. He was prevented
from striking Karen Mortenson only by the intervention of one of the
Mortenson's teen-age daughters. Craig Mortenson was rushed by Life
Flight to the University Medical Center for emergency surgery for
compound depressed skull fracture, which was required to save his
life.
2. Conversation with Roland Olsen in which he stated that
on September 22, 1990, in the early morning hours Mark Long and
Roland Olsen were parked at another 7-Eleven on 7204 West 3500

(Continued on page 5)
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South. A verbal altercation developed between Roland Olsen and Mark
Long in one truck, and Dustin Ward and a group of juveniles in
another truck. Suddenly there were twelve or more young men in the
parking lot, including David Streeter, Dustin Ward and Kevin Neff. A
fight developed, Roland Olsen observed Mark Long lying on the ground
and saw David Streeter, Dustin Ward and Kevin Neff repeatedly jumping
on and kicking Mark Long in the face and head. Ward, Streeter and
Neff along with the others left the area. Roland Olsen found Mark
Long was unconscious. He followed Ward, Streeter and Neff and the
others and confronted them about Long's Condition. David Streeter
pulled a 22 semi-automatic pistol and threatened to blow Olsen's head
off. Olsen turned and retreated while others chanted "shoot him,
shoot him,M Dustin Ward was throwing rocks at Olsen. When Olsen was
approximately twenty feet away from the group he heard the gun fire.
A projectile landed near his £eet. As he turned back around he was
struck in the face by a tire jron. Then Kevin Neff struck him with a
metal pipe. Mr* Olsen went back to the 7-Eleven. Mark Long required
emergency surgery on his fractured skull to save his life.

Judge
Authorized for presentment and
filing:
DAVID E. YOCOM, Counfey Attorney

/&a<

., Deputy

December^?, IS
lls/4^6 - Amended lis [Merg/90181565]
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O.K. I'm Detective
what it your name?

Cowley vith

the police

department and

David
David what?
David Streeter
Spell you last name for me.
Streeter
What is your date of birth?
09-14-72
And you address?
3551 South 7200 West
Your home phone number?
250-9546
Have you been advised of your rights?
Yes
I'm going to.do it again.
You have the right to remain
silent. Anything you say can and will be used against you
in a court of lav. You have the right to talk to a lavyer
and have him
present vith you while you
are being
questioned. If you cannot afford a hire a lavyer, one vill
be appointed to represent you before any questioning if you
vish.
You can decide at anytime to exercise these rights
and not ansver any questions or make any statements. Do you
understand these rights that I have explained to you?
Yes
Having these rights in mind do you vish to speak vith us nov
vithout an attorney present?
No
You don't vant to talk to us?
I don't knov vhy I am really even in here. All I was doing
vas sleeping over at my friends lavn last night and the cops
just come ripping in the yard and arrested us and
Well ve have a bunch of questions ve would like to ask you,
vould you be villing to ansver those questions vithout a

Page 2
Interview with David Streeter
lawyer present.
DS:

Maybe some of them.
know why I am here.

It

just depends cause I

really don't

TC:

So does that mean we can ask you
answer the ones you want to answer?

DS:

Yes I have the right to stop at any time though.

TC:

Well, I111 tell you right now that if you take that attitude
with us.

DS:

Well I ainft trying to

TC:

Because we have all the witnesses we need and we know who
has done what and who has done what to who. So I want the
truth out of you and I want it now.
Now do you understand
that?

DS:

Yes

TC:

Who were you with tonight

DS:

J.D.

TC:

Who else?

DS:

Some of my friends, I want my lawyer here,
do is call my mom and he vill be down here.

TC:

You vant your attorney?

DS:

Yes

TC:

And you don't vant to talk to us?

DS:

Yes

TC:

O.K.

questions and

you will

all you have to
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TC: > Do you recall earlier that I had advised you of your rights?
DS: <-Yes
TC: ^ And after being advised of
wanted to talk to a lawyer?

your rights you

said that

you

DS: ^Yes
TC:

is it your desire and you come
you want to talk to me now?

;TNOW

forth voluntarily that

DS: / Yes
TC: fAnd you want to talk to me without a lawyer?
DS: t Yes
TC: .- Go ahead,
DS: ;Just tell the story.
TC: ' Tell the story.
DS:'cO-K. we was just coming home from that party...
w

ve n .

TC:

Now hold on, you say "we" who is

DS:

It was m^anj^Bart^in^the^car-.xa^Inr-his^car«._^

TC:

Now does Bart go by Kevin.

DS:

Yes

TC:

And whofs car is that?

DS:

Bart's car, and some guy, he had his brights
and that guy in front of us*

TC:

Which direction were you going?

DS:

West

TC:

So you were going West on?

DS:

On 41, so then-he-pulled over-and. let us go ahead of him and.
then he pulled-behind us and-turned his brights on.
So we pulled over and let him go in front of us and we
pulled down the street-and then*he-started to get out*of his-

on, Bart did.
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car and so ve jumped out of our
and I smacked the window.

car and he got back in his

TC:

With vhat?

DS:

My hand, and then (inaud)

TC:

You don't xnov vho they vere?

DS:

No

TC:

Did you ever kick the car?

DS:

No, I didn't kick the car.
And then he drove away and then
ve vas going back to my house and ve drove by '41 and ve got
back from 41 and vent to 72 and he vas at the 7-11 and he
started saying shit to us so ve pulled over vent back and
valked up to him.

TC:

So after the occurrence of hitting the car and kicking the
car, then he left. Then you left right after him?

DS:

No, about 5 minutes.

TC:

So, on your vay to your house you sav.

DS:

Yes, ve got back on 41 and he vas at the 7-11.

TC:

You. sav_the_station. vagon. at..the 7-11?

DS:

Yes,.and they started.yelling shit at us.

TC:

Which 7-11 vere you at?

DS:

The one m 4100 and 6400.

TC:

So you drove by and you sav the car there?

DS:

And he started yelling shit at us and so ve pulled over *nd
valked up there.

TC:

Where did you pull over at?

DS:

Just on 4100.

TC:

So you didn't pull into the 7-11 parking lot?

DS:

And he had a hammer and he. said "Nov I can kick your guys
ass", something to that effect. So he vas coming at us atnd
so I picked a rock.up. and threw it at him.
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TC:

How big was the rock?

DS:
BS:

Just a little bigger than a golf ball.
Biggea^that:.ai.golf_bal.lLajid.. smaller^ than: a. soft, ball?

DS:

Yes; a lot
baseball.

TC:

So you picked up a rock, where did you get the rock from?

DS:

Just on the ground, I just reached down and grabbed

TC:

And then you threw it and hit him in the head.

DS:

I guess it :~'hit* him iri'-th'e—head, I don f t
know. All*il
was
really going to:do- was" scare_him,;^try-^^to_get.him_to1-back_up
vi t h -1 he ha mme r '.~*

TC:

Then what happened?

DS:

iL_guess^_he_hit.,Bart-with-that

TC:

Then what happened?

DS:

Then.the.girl-jumped

TC:

What did they do?

DS:

Wrestled me. to. the..ground,-* and. then_I__got_ upland.L~got^thaJ:
guy_of f. Bart and ..I .said_*let„,s get-out of.here".

TC:

Did you do anything else to that guy besides throw a rock at
him and hit him.

DS :

I*.might" have kicked^ himr

TC:

Where?

smaller

than

a

soft

ball,

smaller

than

a

it.

hammer»

on_me.

DS:

/In- the- chest*' (inaud)

TC:

Was he laying on the ground when you did that?

TC:

Did you do anything else.

DS:

No

TC:

You didn f t hit him in the head and chest and you didn f t grab
a rock and hit him in the head with a rock.

Page 6
Interview with David S t r e e t e r
OS:

Oh, (Li.hit hinuvhen. I_threy_tha t.rock_ the « f i r s t . i t ime_..*

TC:

But you d i d n ' t h i t him with a rock a f t e r

DS:

No

TC:

But you didnft hit him in the head.

DS:

No, (inaud)

TC:

Did you hit him with anything else?

DS:

No

TC:

Then what happened?

DS:

We took off and vent back to my house and sat there and
everybody-was-leaving-and—Dustin.and-Ron_and..Nerd.^ they..was
leaving-LandJLL.guess~they-vent—to_the_ 7rll^to^ get.gas/ I
don't know.
We vis all getting ready for bed and the next
thing you know Neri- vas. knocking, at- the. door.

TC:

Who is Nerd?

DS:

NerdJis-Cody.2

DS:

And he says
Dustin".

TC:

Down vhere?

DS:

The 7-11.

TC:

Which one?

DS:

3500 and 7200.

TC:

Go ahead.

DS:

So*- ve**ram dovrr* there*....

TC:

Nov you say "ve", vho is "ve"?

DS:

Me-and-J-.D7-and-Nerd-vas-rvith-us.<*

TC:

So Cody.

DS:

And that is ail that vas in the house.

TC:

What about Kevin?

"some

guy started

a

that?

fight down

there

with
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DS :

0h"-yes>« Bart* toor

TC:

So you guys vent down to the 7-11 to help Dustin out?

DS:

Yes

TC:

Then what happened?

DS:

There were- two-guys,chasing..him. around..the. parking-lot*.

TC:
DS:

Chasing Dustin?
Yes and I don't know where Ron was. Ron wasn't helping him.
And the^one^r-run. up_to,. Bart>_Dustin- was.n. backing^up and. Barty
walkedj^up_by_him and-one grabbed Bart., and., threw.. him_aga ins t.
vthe.... car and-^ Dustiri: camera- from, around .^ the. side.. o£..;_hiiD^.andV
punched., him. and. dropped .him.~£

TC:

With one punch?

DS: . Yes
TC:

And he fell down on the ground and this
lot of 7-11.

was in the parking

DS:

Yes

TC:

Then what happened?

DS:

Then the., o t h e r s one* had^^Jay-by^the** hair- and so---we-ran—. up,
there* and- got-him-off^and^we^justrtook^off**

TC:

Who kicked this guy on the ground?

DS:

£ kicked-him-once.

TC:

Where?

DS:

In the * headT*

TC:

Did you see anyone else kick him?

DS:

No

TC;

So after Dustin hit him and this guy fell down on the ground
you kicked him in the head?

DS:

Yes

TC:

And you didn't see anyone else kick him?
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DS:

I was getting out of there, all I did was vent and got that
guy off Jay and ve^took^^^running^^cj^to^ my-house.

TC:

Who is "ve"?

DS:

*ie- andrJay_and_Bart> Bart vas probably already at my house.
I just told them to get out of there.

TC:

Who had the gun?

DS:

Jay_ had. a. BB. gurr.

TC:

When did he get that?

DS:

Probably after ve vent back to the house, I didn't even knov
he had it cause I took off, I vas getting out of there I
didn't vant nothing to do vith cops.

TC:

So you vent back to your house c id did you guys come back to
the 7-11 again after J.D. got th* gun?

DS:

No, tthe^jJeep; earner up:, by my" hous*-7 from the-parking..lot vith af
crovbar. and_vas-going-to: kill: Dusting

TC:

From vhat parking lot?

DS:

Ream's, so~ve,all ranwover^.there and

TC:

So you ran over to the Ream's parking lot to help Dustin?

DS:

Just to see vhat vas going on because all ve.: could hear:.vas/
Dustin-saying-TheJs^got. a. crovbar" or something.

TC:

And that's vhen J.D. had the gun.

DS:

Yes, cause vhen I got
gun.

TC:

Who's gun does that belong to?

DS:

It vas tJayJs.

TC:

Where is the gun nov?

DS:

I have no idea.

TC:

You don't knov vhat happened to it?

DS:

No, I vas getting out of there.
vith it.

over there that is vhen J.D.

had the

I didn't vant nothing to do
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TC:

What did you see J.D. do with the gun/ did you see him point
it at anybody?

DS:

He just had it in his hand, he didn't point it at anybody.

TC:

Did he point it at anybody, did he shoot at anybody?

DS:

No, it wasn't loaded (inaud)

TC:

Then after the altercation in the parking lot at Ream's what
happened?

DS:

That guy left
house.

TC:

So you didn't go back down by the 7-11 to check on this
other guy. So you don't know what happened to him? But §CQU:E7
jcickedrhimconcejrinrthe^head^whiler.heii,wasjLon^ the, ground?..

DS:

HtFVas^onT-his^way^down^

TC:

Did you see anybody else kick him or hit him
how about Kevin?

DS:

The only time I saw Bart was when that guy had him up
against the car and Dustin smacked that guy and he was on
his was down and_I kicked him and that is the last time I
seen Kevin, (inaud)

TC:

Going back to the first incident at the 7-11
how many times did you hit and kick that guy?

DS:

/I-kicked: him one-.time: and- IT don't., even- thin^I'-hit-him^

TC:

You. didn't hit. him with-your-fist?..

DS:

M or~-

TC:

So you only
head?

DS:

I guess so

TC:

And then you kicked him in the head?

DS:

No

TC:

Where did you kick him?

DS:

Across th_e_sUJ&«^

and then we

hit him once

left and we

with a rock

went over to

Jay's

on the ground,

on 6400 West

and that was

in the
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TC:

Across the shoulder, vas he
kicked him?

DS:

He was on top of Bart.

TC:

What did you see Bart do to him?

DS:

(inaud)
quick.

TC

What did they do?

DS

Just vrestled me dovn. -

TC

What did you do to the girls?

DS

Just pushed them avay and told them to back off.

TC

You didn't hit them with your fist or kick them?

DS

No, I_wouldnj t_ hit a girl. _

TC

You didn't hit them vith a rock.

DS

No, that laj3y_came^A|te?_me_yith a nammer..

TC

I didn't

have a

laying on the

chance, them

„P;id_ yqu^hit^her^ v.i tji_ a xock:?

DS
TC

Did,.you„throv. a_rock., at her?^

DS

No

TC

You are sure?

DS

Ifm positive.

ground when

girls jumped

on
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MEMORANDUM DECISION

THE STATE OF UTAH,

CASE NOS. (9ll900"262t
911900263
911900264

Plaintiff,
vs.
DAVID STREETER, DUSTIN WARD,
KEVIN NEFF,
Defendants.

The Court heard defendant

Streeter's Motion

evidence on the 23rd day of September, 1991.
represented by Brooke C. Wells.
Barbara J. Byrne.

to Suppress
Defendant was

Plaintiff was represented by

The Court heard the testimony of witnesses,

heard oral argument and took the matter under advisement.

The

Court having read the transcript of the preliminary hearing and
the cases cited is now ready to rule.
The facts are undisputed that the defendant, while being
interrogated by Detective Cowley unequivocally requested that
an attorney

be present.

At that point

in time,

Detective

Cowley terminated the questioning and defendant was returned to
the holding cell.
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Later on that night defendant told Detective Edwards that
he would like to talk to Detective Cowley.

Detective Edwards

arranged for the meeting.
At

the

time

Detective

Cowley

and

defendant

met,

the

following dialogue took place:

TC:

Do you recall earlier that I had advised you
of your rights?

DS:

Yes

TC:

And after being advised of your rights you
said that you wanted to talk to a lawyer?

DS:

Yes

TC:

Now is it your desire and you come forth
voluntarily that you want to talk to me now?

DS:

Yes

TC:

And you want to talk to me without a lawyer?

DS:

Yes

TC:

Go ahead.

DS:

Just tell the story.

TC:

Tell the story.

DS:

O.K.
we was
party. . .

just

coming

home

from

that

The issue presented to the Court was whether or not the
confession of the defendant should be suppressed inasmuch as
defendant had unequivocally requested that counsel be present.
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In State v. Sampson. 156 Utah Adv. Rep, 4, this issue was
addressed and the Utah Appellate Court ruled that "once right
to

counsel

statements

has
made

invoked11

been
without

[the

subsequent

defendant's]

incriminating

attorney

present

[violates] the rights secured to the defendant by the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution,
However, the Court went on to say

in a footnote, "The

Edwards Court, Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), did not
foreclose the possibility of waiver of right to counsel when a
defendant,

once

having

invoked

the

right,

freely

initiates

further conversation with officers even though the defendant
has not consulted counsel."
The Edwards case also set forth the following criteria for
the admission of a confession after a request for an attorney
had been made by the defendant.
1.

The police officer conducting the first interrogation

ceased interrogation when the defendant requested counsel.
this case the police did stop interrogation

In

upon defendant's

request for counsel.
2.

The defendant, not the police officers, must initiate

the conversations in which incriminating statements are made.
The

evidence

was

undisputed

that

defendant

initiated

conversations.
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The defendant made a knowing and intelligent waiver of

his right to counsel.
of the transcript

In reading lines 1 through 8 of page 3

of the interrogation

it is evident that

defendant understood that he had a right to counsel and that he
elected to proceed without benefit of counsel.
There was no evidence presented that would indicate that
defendant did not make an intelligent and voluntary decision to
proceed with the interrogation.
The Court concludes that the credible evidence requires the
Court to deny defendant's Motion to Suppress.
Dated this

/** day of October, 1991.

JOHN A. ROKICH
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy
of the foregoing Memorandum
this

Decision,

to the following,

day of October, 1991:

Barbara J. Byrne
Deputy County Attorney
Attorney for Plaintiff
231 East 400 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Brooke C. Wells
Attorney for Defendant
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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